instrument subject to the defence of original absence of consideration. -Indeed, "a bill or note .. is both a chattel and a chose in action." Its ownership "involves not only the right to possess a thing but the right to sue. .. " 10 Corresponding "to the duplex nature of the negotiable instrument," equities affecting it "must [thus] be classified. .. as they relate to... ownership of the chattel or to liability on
[the] obligation." '" Equities affecting the right to sue and recover on the obligation, side by side with those affecting the right to possess the piece of paper, consitute defects of title 12 to which a holder not in due course is subject. 1 " Consistent with this analysis, the American Uniform Commercial Code follows its predecessor the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and explicity provides that " [w]ant. . . of consideration is a defense as against any person not having the rights of a holder in due course." " Against the absence of a corresponding provision in the Anglo-Canadian Act, Falconbridge concludes however that " [o] riginal absence of consideration is not a defect of title or equity attaching to the instrument." 11 He bases his view on pre-Act cases 1 as well as on the fact that "absence of consideration is not one of the defects of title specified in [the Act]." 1 He adds that " [t] he general principle, that absence of consideration is not a defect of title, seems to be implied in s. 54 18 which defines a holder for value." His summary is in line with Chalmers." "Original absence of consideration .
is a matter of defence against an immediate party, or a remote party 2" who is not a holder for value, but it is not a l Chafee, "Rights in Overdue Paper" (1918) 31 Harv.L.Rev. 1104, 1109. The "right to sue " in this context is the power to enforce the obligation rather than the standing to bring the action.
11 Ibid., p. 1110.
12 Equities affecting the instrument or " attaching to the bill " are interchangeable with defects of title": Chalmers, supra, note 9, p. This summary reflects the prevailing view on the availability of -absence of consideration as a defence to an action on a bill or note.24 .The present article challenges this summary by critically examining and refuting its grounds. It presents the proposition that absence of consideration tb a promise on a bill 5 or note is an equity as to the liability of the promisor, which under the Anglo-Canadian Act is available to him as a defence against every holder not in due course. While there is no direct authority supporting it, it will be argued that unlike Falconbridge's summary, this proposition is consistent with general principles of law as well as with the scheme of the Act. Thus, pursuing Chalmers's example, 26 when C negotiates the note (made in his favour by B by way of gift) to D, D's power to recover from B depends on whether he (D) is a holder in due course. Otherwise, having a title to a piece of paper and to an unenforceable promise, D is under the same disability as C. The power of a subsequent holder E (D's indorsee) to recover from B depends on whether he himself (E) is a holder in due course,, or alternatively on whether he "derives title to [the note] through a holder in due course [i.e., D], and . . . is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality affecting it." 27 The holding in due course requirement could be waived only when value is given before the promisor's (B's) death for "an actual dealing for value with a note would complete the gift as a valid donatio morris causa" so as to entitle the holder (even if not in due course) to payment out of B's estate. 2 seller of goods and subsequently discounted with a finance company, the makerbuyer and the payee-seller are immediate parties, the maker-buyer and the indorsee-finance company are remote parties, and the payee-seller and the Falconbridge's reliance on the enumeration of the defects of title in the Act " goes contrary to the accepted view that the examples given by the Act "do not exhaust the category." " As to pre-Act leading cases " establishing that "absence of consideration is not a defect of title or equity attaching to the instrument," 32 Falconbridge himself acknowledges 11 that all involved an accommodation party." 4 They stand for the modest proposition presently provided for by the Act, 3 " that an accommodation party, as a surety to the obligor, is liable to a holder for value notwithstanding the fact that the consideration under the underlying transaction was not given to him (the accommodation party) but to the person accommodated. This however is consistent with the surety's position under general principles of law," and is not a case of "absence of consideration," as consideration in the common law has to move from the promisee, but not necessarily to the promisor. 37 In fact, under the pre-Act cases relied upon by Falconbridge, 28 what could have been an equity attaching to the accommodation bill is in reality "an agreement not to negotiate it after it became due." 11 This, as well as the liability of an accommodation party, is absolutely irrelevant to the proposition that absence of value is or is not a defect of title.
This leaves us with "s. 54 which defines a holder for value." 40 In its relevant part the section provides that " [w]here value has at any time, been given for a bill, the holder is deemed to be a holder for value as regards . . . all parties . . . who become parties prior to [the giving of the value]" (hereafter: the "holder for value" pro- vision). Nonetheless, this is an ambiguous provision. 41 While extending the concept of "holder for value" to cover also a holder who is subsequent in the chain of title to the giving of value, the provision neither defines "holder for value" nor specifies his rights and powers. As such the provision is potentially susceptible to alternative interpretations. Thus, in one context in the Act, "holder for value" denotes the fulfilment of the value requirement as one of the qualifications of a holder in due course. 4 2 The "holder for value" provision could therefore mean that a holder who himself gave no value but derives his title from one who did give value is to be considered as one who "took the bill . . . for value "'
for the purpose of holding in due course. 44 As it is well established that only a holder who himself gave value can qualify as a holder in due course, this interpretation should be rejected. Alternatively, there are those who construe the "holder for value" provision to mean that a holder of an instrument who either takes it for value or derives his title from one who took it for value, overcomes the defence of absence of consideration on a promise of a prior party. 47 As a "holder for value" is not required by the provision to be a holder in due course, the effect of this construction seems indeed to establish " [t]he general principle that absence of consideration is not a defect of title." 's This construction is nonetheless inconsistent with viewing "the benefits of negotiability . . . applied exclusively in favour of a bona fide transferee for value." 49 It is further unsupported by authorities. 5 here, that the reference to the "third person holding the bill for value" was actually directed at the "bona fide holder for value." '. First, there is later in the decision, a reference to the power of such a holder to enforce payment "against good faith and conscience." " This is compatible only with reading "good faith" into the definition of the "holder for value." Secondly, besides "want of consideration," the phrase covers any "other ground to impeach the apparent value received." 14 It is inconceivable that the phrase confers on a holder for value though not in due course the power to overcome every "other ground," for this would put him in the same position of a holder in due course. Thirdly, there are other instances where courts inaccurately used the terms "indorsee for value," 15 holder for value or " remote party '' as interchangeable with " holder in due course." 58 On final account, Collins v. Martin cannot supgift " as a valid donatio mortis causa'" see note 28 and text, supra. There is nothing in the case to suggest its application to either gifts inter vivos or perhaps even to a donee mortis cause who first deals with the instrument for value alter the promisor's (donor's) death. The narrow scope of the decision is reinforced by the fact that Malins V.-C. decided the case primarily on the basis of his desire " to do all [he could] to make the gift good " ibid., p. 733. The executors of the donor's will did not " argue the point adversely to the (donee] " but "only [wished] to see that the case is fairly presented"; ibid., p. 732. 51 (1797) 1 Bos. & Pull. 648, 651; 126 E.R. 1113 per Eyre C.J. emphasis added.
It was held there on the basis of this proposition that one who indorsed bills in blank and handed them to his banker for collection and credit to his account, could not recover the bills from a bona fide pledgee who had lent money to the banker (who had later failed) against the bills. The similarity between the proposition and the case is questionable; in the principal-agent for collection situation (unlike in a donor-donee case), besides want of consideration there is absence of intention to convey anything to the agent (If the customer's account has been credited but not withdrawn-the case anyway involves the failure of consideration by the failure of banker rather than absence of consideration). The pledgee in Collins v. Martin was bona fide, ibid., p. 648. Even if taken at face value, the case is therefore hardly persuasive as to the rights of the holder for value. The court used this peculiar analogy to reach the result in favour of the pledgee as under contemporary law, since Paterson v. Tash (1743) 2 Strang6 1178; 93 E.R. 1110, a pledgee of goods from a factor exceeding his authority was defeated by the principal, ibid., p. 651. The latter law has eventually been reversed by the first Factors Act, 4 Geo. IV, c. 83 (1823). 52 Bona fide holder for value, bona fide holder for value without notice, as well as bona fide holder of the bill without notice before it is overdue, are all synonyms substituted in the Act by " holder in due course"; cf. Chalmers, supra, note 9, p. 94. port the power of a holder for value to' overcome the defence of absence of original consideration.
An argument that absence of consideration is not an equity as to liability cannot rest on the language of the "holder for value" provision. Indeed, as by its own terms it is inapplicable to the relations between immediate parties," 5 the provision is consistent with pre-Act case law under which absence of consideration constitutes an equity as to the liability of an immediate party." 0 While under the provision remote parties are liable towards a holder for value, there is nothing to suggest therein that this liability depends on one's signature alone and is irrespective of the absence of consideration. Indeed, reading the "holder for value" provision as meaning that absence of consideration is not a defence to the liability of a remote party whose promisee gave no consideration, is often explained on the basis that "the party who first parts with consideration is deemed to have done so in reliance upon the promises of all the parties whose names appear on the instrument." " Yet if it is the reliance on the appearance of the instrument which counts, it is hard to see why it is only the defence of absence of consideration and not any other defence to liability which is overcome. It is further hard to see how this explanation is provided in the context of one who is not only not a holder in due course but may well have actual knowledge of the absence of consideration.
The argument that absence of consideration is not a defence as to the liability can be made only by analogy to the language of the section dealing with an accommodation party which speaks of the latter's liability to a holder for value in absolute terms.
2 Nonetheless, this kind of language is characteristic to the whole legislative technique of the Act. Though the engagement of each party to an instrument, whether the acceptor, drawer or endorser is defined as absolute and unrelated to the holder's title, 63 the right to enforce full payment on an instrument over equities affecting it depends on the plaintiff's status as a holder in due course." Not reading this dependence as to the entitlement of the "holder for value," would confer on him the power to overcome any defence as to liability and . not only on absence of consideration 65 as if he were a holder in due course. This indeed is untenable."
Finally, it is ioteworthy that also the American Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law " contained a " holder for value "provision 68 side by side with a section establishing the liability of an accommodati'on party towards a holder for value." Both provisions were modelled on their counterparts in the Act. and used language virtually identical to them. The American statute contained however a third section. providing that absence of consideration "is a matter of defence against any person not a holder in due course." 1o Hence this reflects, that it would be totally incompatible to construe the "holder for value" provision as establishing that absence of consideration is not an equity as to the liability of a remote as well as an immediate party.
It is submitted here, that in its true sense the "holder for'value" provision means that absence of consideration is not an equity as to ownership. The provision does not deal with' absence of consideration as an equity as to liability. Its effect is indeed that only inasmuch as a holder seeks to establish his property in the instrument rather than to charge a party with liability, absence of consideration is not a defect of title."' Thus, as "the outgrowth of the fundamental idea in the law of negotiable paper ... that a bill or note is a species of property," the provision means that once "value has ... been given for the! instrument, it becomes the subject of gift." 72 Accordingly, " [i]f a party gives to another a negotiable instrument, on which other parties are liable, the man who makes the gift cannot recover the bill back, and the man to whom the bill is given may recover against the other parties on the bill." 11 As such the "holder for value '' provision is merely a " sheltering" provision 14 which is complementary to the section conferring on the transferee for value "such title as the transferor had," '-as well as to another section giving to " [a] holder . . . who derives his title to a bill through a holder in due course" the same "rights of that holder in due signed by D payable to H (" cheque I ") in return for another cheque drawn by G payable to D, which was delivered to D by H (" cheque II "). On his part, H gave G his own cheque payable to G (" cheque III-").'When D sued G on cheque II, G (who had been unable to collect from H on cheque III), argued that he had received no consideration from D. Finding that the case "turns upon the construction of. [the 'holder for value' provision]" , a unanimous
Court of Appeal 14 held that D "clearly . . . falls within all the requirements of the section " 85 and decided in his favour.
, It is submitted here that the "holder for value" provision was totally irrelevant in resolving this case. In holding that " [t] here is nothing in the subsectioi which appears to require value to have been given by the holder as long as value has been given for [cheque II] " 86 the court stated the obvious but failed to see that this. did not establish" an indefeasible right [on cheque II]." 87 Moreover, in the facts of the case D did give value for cheque II by paying H for it with cheque I. As consideration has to move from the promisee but not necessarily to the promisor, 8 8 this could have supported D's entitlement. Yet no direct contractual relationship ever existed between D and G. The proper analysis of the case is rather that H, the " remitter" of cheque II, procured its issuance 89 and by paying for it to G with cheque III became its owner. Thereby he came to be in position "to confer title to [cheque II] upon the payee." "0 D himself acquired title to cheque II by purchasing it from H for value i(paying H for it with cheque I). The point to be decided was whether D, the payee of cheque II but a purchaser thereof, could qualify as a holder in due course " so as to overcome the failure of consideration (the dishonour of cheque III) between G and H. In determining this issue, the "holder for value" provision is indeed immaterial. Reading it as establishing a special status of "holder for value" and as such imposing some kind of absolute liability on the instrument was indeed a source of confusion.
IV
The "holder for value" provision is one aspect of the general proposition that any transfer of an instrument, whether by endorse-
